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In this paper, we analyze the variance in audit quality among a broad cross-section of listed firms 
in Chinese stock market from 1999 to 2012. The purpose of the analysis is to identify the 
importance of audit firm, audit client, and engagement auditor effects on the variance in audit 
quality. Using discretionary accruals and financial restatement to surrogate audit quality and 
based on simultaneous ANOVA method, we find that engagement auditor can add about 19% of 
incremental explanatory power to the variance in audit quality. As expected, audit firm effects and 
audit client effects also have significant influence on audit quality, which can add about 2% and 
16% of incremental explanatory power to the variance in audit quality. In addition, we find that, 
relative to engagement auditors with short audit experience, engagement auditors with longer 
audit experience have no significant incremental power in explaining variance in audit quality. 
The analysis enriches previous studies by investigating audit client’s role and engagement 
auditor’s role in determining audit quality. Our study highlights the importance of understanding 
audit quality from the perspective of individual auditor. 
 





egulators, policy makers, investors, and researchers in accounting field have long been interested in 
understanding the determinants of audit quality. What do we know till now about the variance of 
audit quality? In the U.K., the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) has articulated a framework for 
audit quality that identifies five drivers of audit quality: the culture within an audit firm, skills and personal qualities 
of engagement auditors, effectiveness of the audit process, reliability and usefulness of audit reporting, and factors 
outside the control of auditors such as corporate governance, audit committees, and shareholders support of auditors 
(FRC, 2006). Francis (2011) presents similar framework for understanding and researching in audit quality, in which 
he states:  
 
“Audits are of higher quality at the input level when the people implementing audit tests are competent and 
independent, and when the testing procedures used are capable of producing reliable and relevant evidence. The 
quality of audit inputs flow through to the audit process, where audits are of high quality when the engagement team 
personnel make good decisions regarding the specific tests to be implemented and appropriately evaluate the 
evidence from these tests in leading to the audit report. Audit quality is affected by the accounting firm in which the 
auditors work. Firms develop the testing procedures used on audit engagements, and create incentives that affect 
the behavior of engagement team personnel. Last, the incentives of accounting firms and individual auditors to 
produce high-quality audits are affected by the institutions that regulate auditing and punish auditors and 
accounting firms for misconduct and low-quality audits”. 
 
R 
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FRC (2006) and Francis (2011) both emphasize the importance of audit client, accounting firm, and 
engagement auditor in determining audit quality. However, prior researches more incline to focus on audit firm’s 
role in determining audit quality, and a large number of empirical literature has provided valuable insights from the 
perspective of audit firm-level (Palmrose 1988; Becker et al. 1998; Lennox 1999; Francis et al. 1999; Reynolds and 
Francis 2000; Khurana and Raman 2004; Behn et al. 2008; Francis 2011; Francis and Michas 2013), audit office-
level (Reynolds and Francis 2000; Francis and Yu 2009; Li 2009; Choi et al. 2010), and accounting firm industry 
expertise (Krishnan 2003; Ferguson et al. 2003; Francis et al. 2005; Reichelt and Wang 2010).  So far, besides lately 
empirical studies on partners tenure (Carey and Simnett 2006; Chen et al. 2008; Wang et al. 2012), little research 
tries to explore the role of audit clients and engagement auditors in determining audit quality. Do the audit clients 
and engagement auditors really matter to audit quality? 
 
The research on this question is very important for several reasons. First, the association between audit 
clients and audit quality expand our knowledge about whether and how audit clients influence audit quality. 
Financial statements are jointly produced by clients and their engagement auditors (Antle and Nalebuff 1991; 
Nelson et al. 2002; Gibbins et al. 2010), and large clients create economic dependence that may cause auditors to 
compromise their independence (Reynolds and Francis 2000). Engagement auditors need to collect sufficient 
competent evidence before issuing audit reports. However, the difficulty of collecting sufficient competent audit 
evidence varies among different audit clients. In addition, the financial conditions, audit risks, and audit 
complexities also vary among audit clients, and these factors have been documented having the power to influence 
audit quality. Lawrence et al. (2011) articulate that differences in audit quality between Big 4 and non-Big 4 firms 
may largely reflect client characteristics, so they encourage other scholars to explore alternative methodologies that 
separate client characteristics from audit-quality effects. In this research, we contribute to the literature by 
comparing the relative incremental explaining power of audit client effects in the determination of audit quality with 
several other effects. 
 
Second, the relation between engagement auditors and audit quality expand our knowledge about whether 
and how engagement auditor influences audit quality. Auditing process is “primarily human endeavors and audit 
firms are very dependent upon the quality of their professionals, including competence and decision-making skills” 
(Prawitt et al. 2009)
1
. Many scholars call for research on engagement auditors’ role in the determination of audit 
quality. Nelson and Tan (2005) call for more attention to individual auditor characteristics in the design of judgment 
decision-making research, and Hurtt (2010) develops a measure of an individual auditor’s capacity for professional 
skepticism. Francis (2011) argues that auditors’ knowledge of auditing theory/standards is critical to audit quality 
and the audits are of higher quality when undertaken by competent auditors. Surprisingly, little empirical research 
has been done on this topic in the past 20 years, and we still know very little about the engagement auditor’s role in 
the determination of audit quality and why it is important. 
 
Third, researching on the relation between engagement auditors and audit quality can provide evidence to 
the current policy debate on engagement auditor identification. As we discussed in prior section, individual 
engagement auditor has the potential to influence audit quality, disclosing individual engagement auditors’ name on 
audit report may convey useful information to shareholders with regard to audit and the quality of financial report. 
Considering this reasoning, the Public Accounting Oversight Board (hereafter the PCAOB) issued “Concept Release 
on Requiring the Engagement Partner to Sign the Audit Report” (hereafter Concept) on July 28, 2009, proposing to 
mandate the engagement auditors to sign their name on the audit report in addition to the existing requirement for 
the firm to sign the audit report. There are two key issues concerned about the Concept: (1) whether audit quality 
varies with individual engagement auditor in addition to firm level characteristics
2
? (2) Whether engagement 
auditors’ individual characteristics convey information useful to shareholders with regard to audit quality? To our 
best knowledge, little empirical evidence exists for the above questions and the PCAOB calls for research 
investigating these issues (PCAOB 2009, page 9). 
 
                                                 
1 DeFond and Francis (2005) suggests pushing the analysis to individual level, if possible, because determinants of audit quality should be more 
significant at individual level. 
2 In the Concept, the PCAOB states “Providing financial statement users, audit committees, and others with the name of the engagement partner 
might help them evaluate the extent of an engagement partner’s experience on a particular type of audit and, to a degree, his or her track record.” 
(PCAOB 2009, page8-9).  
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In this research, based on the approach used in McGahan and Porter (2002), we decompose the variance of 
audit quality into components associated with audit client, audit firm, and engagement auditor
3
. Prior studies related 
to audit quality incorporated the assumption that audit firm or audit office shaped auditor’s characteristics, which in 
turn drive audit quality. This assumption implicitly ruled out alternative directions of causality. No provisions were 
made for the possibility that audit quality is driven by engagement auditor or engagement auditor influences the 
quality of audit firm or audit office. Following McGahan and Porter (2002), we employ a simultaneous ANOVA 
implemented using regression analysis
4
. The simultaneous ANOVA allows for a full set of covariance effects but 
does not assume randomness in the model errors. This study departs from much of the cross-sectional literature by 
being fundamentally concerned with the importance of audit firm effects, audit client effects, and engagement 
auditor effects, not just with coefficient signs and t-statistics. 
 
We investigate the research questions based on the audit data from Chinese stock market, where 
engagement auditors are required to sign their name on the audit reports
5
. Following prior studies, we use absolute 
discretionary accruals and financial restatement as the proxies of low audit quality (Becker et al. 1998; Francis et al. 
1999; Carey and Simnett 2006; Francis and Yu 2009; Francis 2011; Francis et al. 2013). Using the data from 1999 
to 2012, we find that, as documented before, audit firm is one of the most important factors in the determination of 
audit quality, which is indicated by it accounts for about 2% of the explanation power of audit quality. We find that 
audit client accounts for about 16% of the explanation power of audit quality, and engagement auditor accounts for 
about 19% of the explanation power of audit quality. It is the first time to find the audit client and engagement 
auditor has incremental explanation power in the determination of audit quality using empirical analysis based on 
large sample. 
 
Several studies began to concern about the effect of engagement auditor tenure or audit experience on audit 
quality (Carey and Simnett 2006; Chen et al. 2008; Wang et al. 2012). They have not drawn consistent conclusions 
about the association between engagement auditor tenure (audit experience) and audit quality. We measure the audit 
experience as the number of years the engagement auditor began his or her career as an auditor, and then we further 
divide the audit experience into general audit experience and client-specific audit experience. However, we find no 
evidence that the engagement auditors who have longer general or client-specific audit experience have significant 
higher incremental explanation power in the determination of audit quality. 
 
We note that some caveats may compound the results we find in this paper. First, the analysis is based the 
data come from Chinese stock market, where the regulations on capital market and audit practice are different from 
the developed markets, such as U.S., U.K., Australia etc., which limits the generalizability of our results. Further 
research should try to investigate the variance of audit quality based on cross-country data. Second, the variables we 
used as proxies of audit quality also may compound the results we find in this paper. We use absolute discretionary 
accruals and financial restatement as the proxies of audit quality. Although most of the prior studies use these 
variables as the proxies of audit quality and have documented that these variables can reflect audit quality on some 
extent, however, these variables are still not the direct measure of audit quality
6
. Francis (2011) argues that 
engagement-level audit failures can be unambiguously identified when there is successful civil litigation against 
auditors or audit firms. We use proxies instead of direct measure because the successful civil litigations against 
auditors or audit firms are very rare during our research interval. Further study should use the direct measure of 
audit quality if they can get enough data. 
 
Besides the caveats we discussed above, this research contributes to the literature in the following ways. 
First, this research may help regulators, policy makers, investors, and accounting scholars to better understand the 
                                                 
3 McGahan and Porter (2002) employ a simultaneous ANOVA implemented using regression analysis. They decompose the accounting 
profitability across business segments into the components associated with industry, corporate-parent, and business-specific.  
4 We do not use components-of-variance (COV) and nested ANOVA because: the COV approach requires the assumption that each of the effects 
on a particular firm is drawn independently of the others and the nested ANOVA approach does not model covariance between effects. The 
strong covariance between audit firm and engagement auditor effects suggests flaws in the assumptions required under both approaches.  
5 The China Certified Public Accountants Auditing Standards (CCPAAS) No.7- Audit report (1996, 2003) stipulates that the two engagement 
auditors must sign their name on the audit report.  
6 Francis (2011) define audit failure as “an audit failure occurs if the auditor is not independent in fact, or if an independent auditor incorrectly 
issues a clean audit report due to the failure to collect sufficient competent evidence as required by auditing standards”. And Francis (2011) also 
admits that the extant evidence indicates there are relatively few demonstrable audit failures.  
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multiple drivers of audit quality. The results of this paper indicate that in addition to audit firms, audit clients and 
engagement auditors also have significant incremental explanation power in the determination of audit quality. 
Second, our research is the first paper to decompose variance of audit quality into components relates to audit firm, 
audit client, and engagement auditor, respectively. This research design enables us to estimate the effects of each 
part separately and makes the effects of each part comparable. Third, the results we find in this research provide 
direct evidence to the policy debate on mandatory engagement auditor identification. The results indicate that 
engagement auditor accounts for about 19% of incremental explanatory power in the determination of audit quality, 
which is highest among all the factors. That is to say, engagement auditor is the most important factor in the 
determination of audit quality. The results of this research also have some implications for policy makers and audit 
firms. Given the importance of engagement auditor in the determination of audit quality, policy makers (e.g. 
AICPA) should pay more attention to the procedures that enable a person to get his/her CPA certification. Audit 
firms should pay more attention to the skills and ethic level when hiring auditors, and audit firms also should care 
more about their training procedures. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: we review the literature in Section 2; Section 3 explains the 
methods we employed in this research, the data and sample used in this research are also introduced in this section. 
Section 4 displays the empirical results. Section 5 presents the robust tests. Section 6 consists of some additional 
tests. Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Francis (2011) proposes a framework for understanding and researching in audit quality, in which he points 
out that audit quality is comprehensively determined by audit firm, engagement auditor, and institutions that regulate 
auditing. Audit firms hire, train, and evaluate audit personnel, and prescribe the testing procedures to be used on 
audit engagements and auditing takes place within the context of an audit firm. The engagement auditors collect and 
evaluate auditing evidence and make auditing judgment decisions based on the specific tests to be implemented and 
their interpretation of evidence from these tests. The audit outcome is an audit report that is issued in the name of 
audit firm, along with client’s audited financial reports. In addition, the auditing procedures, auditors’ incentives, 
and their behavior are influenced by the institutions that regulate auditing. One implication in Francis’s (2011) 
framework is that audit clients also have influence on audit quality because financial statements are prepared by 
audit clients and the difficulty of collecting audit evidence varies among audit clients. Prior research has already 
investigated audit quality from several different perspectives. 
 
2.1 Audit Firm Characteristics And Audit Quality 
 
Studies of the U.S. audit market commonly argue that the audit quality is positively related to audit firm 
size. One of the most influential studies is DeAngelo (1981), who argues that auditors in large audit firms have more 
to lose if they fail to report breaches in clients’ accounting reports, so they have greater motivation to provide higher 
quality audit services. Consistent with this argument, Becker et al. (1998) and Francis et al. (1999) document that 
Big N audit firms help to constrain firms’ earnings management. Teoh and Wong (1993) find that the accounting 
information is more useful to investors if the companies who provide the information are audited by Big Eight audit 
firms. Francis and Krishnan (1999) find that Big Six audit firms are more conservative in issuing clean audit reports 
to their clients. Lennox (1999) documents that Big Four auditors issue more accurate audit reports than do the non-
Big 4 audit firms. Pittman and Fortin (2004) find that the cost of capital is lower for Big Six clients relative to non-
Big 6 clients. 
 
Since the local practice audit offices are the primary decision-making unit for auditing firms, therefore, 
many scholars begin to investigate its effects on audit quality (Wallman, 1996; Francis et al., 1999). Francis and Yu 
(2009) argue that auditors in Big 4 audit offices have more collective experience in administering the audits of SEC 
registrants and, therefore, large audit offices have greater in-house expertise in detecting material problems in the 
financial statements of public companies. Francis and Yu (2009) find that larger Big 4 audit offices provide higher 
audit quality which indicated by larger Big 4 audit offices are more likely to issue going-concern audit reports and 
have better ability to constrain clients’ aggressive earnings management behavior. Many other audit firm 
characteristics have been documented have the potential to influence audit quality, such as auditor tenure, auditor’s 
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industry expertise. Johnson et al. (2002), Ghosh and Moon (2005) find that auditor tenure is related to lower client 
aggressive earnings management behavior. Balsam et al. (2003) and Francis et al. (2005) document that industry 
expertise increases audit quality. 
 
2.2 Client Characteristics And Audit Quality 
 
Lawrence et al. (2011) find that the differences in audit quality are main attributed to client characteristics, 
which suggests that client characteristics are important factors that can influence audit quality. Many researchers 
argue that auditors have incentive to retain influential clients that may force them to compromise audit quality 
(Reynolds and Francis, 2000; Craswell et al., 2002). Knechel et al. (2009) develop a modified audit production 
framework based on Hackenbrack and Knechel (1997)
7
, in which they take client-specific characteristics as 
exogenous factors that would affect both the use of different levels of audit staff and the extent of specific activities 
performed by audit staff. Knechel et al. (2009) find that audit quality is higher for clients that are larger, clients with 
extensive system automation, and clients with a December fiscal year-end, whereas, audit quality is lower for clients 
that receive tax services from the engagement auditor, clients that have subsidiaries, and engagements where the 
auditor relies on internal control. Francis and Yu (2009) argue that client operating segments and geographic 
segments will increase audit complexity and, therefore, can affect audit quality. Carcello and Neal (2000) and 
Abbott et al. (2004) find that the independence of client audit committee is one of the factors that may influence 
audit quality. Khan and Watts (2007) and Lu and Sapra (2009) find that clients with high business risk induce 
auditor conservatism, while clients with low business risk induce auditor aggressiveness. These empirical studies of 
client characteristics illustrate the importance of knowing more about the client who produces the financial report 
and its role in determining audit quality. 
 
2.3 Engagement Auditors And Audit Quality 
 
Engagement auditors is another important factor that can influence audit quality since they make judgment 
decisions based on audit tests, evaluation of evidence, and audit report formation.  In one experimental study, 
Nelson and Tan (2005) call for attention to engagement auditor attributes in the design of judgment decision-making 
research. DeFond and Francis (2005) argues that the determinants of audit quality should be more significant at 
individual level, and they suggest that, if possible, the analysis of determinants of audit quality should be pushed to 
engagement auditor level. In the framework for understanding and researching audit quality, Francis (2011) argues 
that the audit quality will be higher when the auditors implementing audit tests are competent and independent. 
 
Recently, more and more researchers pay attention to the effects of engagement auditor characteristics on 
audit quality. Carey and Simnett (2006) investigate the effects of a auditor’s engagement tenure on audit quality and 
find that auditors with longer tenure have a lower propensity to issue going-concern report to their clients. Their 
results suggest that engagement auditors’ objectivity might become impaired by long-term relationship with clients8. 
In contrast, Wang et al. (2012) find that engagement audit auditor experience increases both actual and perceived 
audit quality based on auditor tenure data in Chinese mainland. Specifically, they find that audit partner experience 
is negatively related to upwards earnings management, and positively associated with the likelihood of issuing 
going-concern opinions to financially distressed clients. They also find that earnings response coefficient and 
abnormal trading volume are higher for clients audited by engagement auditors with more experience. However, 
Chen et al. (2008) find no relationship between partner tenure and audit quality using partner data in Taiwan. Chin 
and Chi (2010) find that audits are of higher quality when the engagement auditor is a woman based on partner data 
in Taiwan. These archival researches of engagement auditor characteristics highlight the importance of knowing 
more about the person who audits and the effect it may have on audit quality. 
 
As previously discussed, the archival literature on audit quality identifies audit firm, audit client, and 
engagement auditor as the important factors that have the power to influence audit quality. However, till now, there 
is no research quantifies the effects of each specific factor on the variance in audit quality. In this paper, we develop 
a framework based on Knechel et al. (2009) by considering audit firm-specific characteristics and engagement 
                                                 
7 Hackenbrack and Knechel (1997) disaggregate labor hours into a matrix, classifying the hours by staff level and by type of audit activity. 
8 Bazerman et al. (1997) argue that it is difficult for engagement auditors to be skeptical and objective toward their longstanding clients. 
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auditor-specific characteristics as the factors that can influence ‘audit production’ and thereby affect ‘audit 
outcome’9. In Figure 1, we also take audit as a production process and assume that engagement auditors expend their 
labor on the audit activities according to the particular audit process to generate the audit evidence, and conclude the 
‘audit outcome’ based on the audit evidence. In the modified audit production framework, Knechel et al. (2009) treat 
client-specific characteristics as exogenous factors that affecting audit production process and ‘audit outcome’, but 
they did not consider the heterogeneity between audit firm and engagement auditor. In this paper, we consider the 
effects of audit firm-specific and engagement auditor-specific characteristics on audit quality besides the effects of 
client-specific characteristics, and decompose the variance in audit quality into the incremental explanatory power 
relate to audit firm, audit client, and engagement auditor, respectively. By doing this, we can identify the importance 
of audit firm-specific, audit client-specific, and engagement auditor-specific effects on audit quality. 
 
 
Figure 1. Framework For Determinants Of Audit Quality 
 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
3.1 Research Model 
 
 To identify the different effects of audit firm, audit client, and engagement auditor on audit quality, we 
employ a simultaneous ANOVA implemented using regression analysis. Simultaneous ANOVA allows for a full set 
of covariance effects but does not assume randomness in the model errors. The analysis relies on the following 
model of client-specific absolute discretionary accruals: 
 
AB_DA k, i, t=t+r+k+n+k, i, t     (1) 
 
In this equation, AB_DA k, i, t is the absolute discretionary accruals in year t of audit client k in industry i. 
The absolute discretionary accruals calculated by modified Jones model developed by Dechow et al. (1995)
10
. On 
the right-hand side, t is the abnormal accruals associated with year t; r is the abnormal accruals associated with 
audit firm r; k is the abnormal accruals associated with audit client k; and n is the abnormal accruals related to 
engagement auditor n; k, i, t is the residual. This model is estimated using dummy variables to represent classes of 
effects. 
 
                                                 
9 In the modified audit production framework, Knechel et al. (2009) take audit as a production unit in which the ‘inputs’ are engagement auditors’ 
labor and the ‘outputs’ are audit activities, and the final ‘outcome’ is the level of assurance of the reliable of clients’ financial reports. They 
assume that labor inputs are used in the audit process to perform audit activities that result in the generation of audit evidence and the greater the 
extent of evidence-gathering activities the greater likelihood that an auditor reaches the correct conclusion about whether the financial reports are 
misstated. Knechel et al. (2009) take client-specific characteristics as exogenous factors that affecting inputs, audit process, evidence-gathering 
activities, and evidence as a whole, and thus have an effect on audit outcome.  
10 In the untabulate tests, we use the performance adjusted discretionary accruals proposed by Kothari et al. (2005) as the proxy of audit quality, 
and we get the similar results. We also use the measure of discretionary accruals developed by Dechow and Dichev (2002), in which the measure 
of accrual quality as the residuals from firm-specific regressions of changes in working capital on past, present, and future operating cash flows, 
and the results are still robust. 
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Instead of reporting the thousands of coefficients estimated for the full model, we present the results in the 
form of an ANOVA in which each class of effects is restricted. Year effects are defined to capture the general 
impact of macroeconomic fluctuations in business activities, and therefore restricted to be equal for all audit firms 
and audit clients. When audit firm or audit client effect is omitted from the full model, the engagement auditor effect 
picks up the variation in audit quality that would have been ascribed to audit firm or to audit client effect. The 
importance of audit firm effects and audit client effects is evaluated by assessing their explanatory power in models 
that exclude engagement auditor effects. 
 
3.2 Data And Sample Selection 
 
We obtain audit data including audit firms and engagement auditors from China Stock Market & 
Accounting Research Database (CSMAR)
11
. Our sample period is from 1999 through 2012. We choose 1999 as the 
start because auditors separate both financially and operationally from government in that year
12
. Other financial 
data used in this research also from CSMAR. 
 
Extant literature has documented that high quality audits constrain managers’ ability to manipulate earnings 
in financial reporting (Becker et al., 1998; Francis et al., 1999; DeFond, 2002).  Therefore, we surrogate audit 
quality with the absolute discretionary accruals in this paper. We estimate discretionary accruals using modified 
Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995) by year and industry conditioning on having at least 20 firms in each industry
13
. 
Following Plumlee and Yohn (2010) and Francis et al. (2013), we also use the “audit failure” which indicated by the 





We start with 24,013 firm-year observations available on CSMAR. We then eliminate 990 observations 
that belong to financial industry; we further delete 206 observations without industry information; finally we delete 
3,330 observations without enough data to calculate discretionary accruals, arriving at 19,487 observations to test 
the associations between the effect of each factor and the variance in audit quality. 
 
3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of variables used in this research. The number of audit clients 
(listed companies) keeps growing from 1999 to 2012. In 1999, there are 839 audit clients in Chinese stock market, 
and this number grows more than twice by 2012, reaches to 2,402. In 1999, there were 106 audit firms that have the 
licenses to audit listed firms and this number decreased to 53 in 2012, which is because Chinese government 
promulgates several regulations to encourage audit firms to merge with each other in 2000 and 2009
15
. Although the 
audit firms keep decreasing, the number of engagement auditors keeps growing from 1999 to 2010. There are 2,589 
engagement auditors in 2012, which is more than three times of the number in 1999. The average of absolute 







                                                 
11 CSMAR is analogous to COMPUSTAT. CSMAR provides information regarding financial statements of all the Chinese listed companies. Its 
sub-database for audit opinion of listed companies in China provides all the information regarding to audit, including audit firms and engagement 
auditors.  
12 Audit firms in China were affiliated to local government before 1999, and their operation was deeply intervened by local government. 
13 There are thirteen industries in Chinese stock market, because more than 50% of China’s listed firms are belong to Manufacture industry, so we 
divided Manufacture industry into 10 sub-industries according to the 2-digit industry code of CSRC. 
14 The Panel of Audit Effectiveness (2000, paragraphs 1.6 and 3.26) notes that a restatement is strongly suggestive that the audit of the originally 
issued financial statements was of unacceptably low quality.  
15 Ministry of Finance (MOF) issued three regulations in 2000 and each one in 2007 and 2009. These regulations first raise the thresholds for 
audit firms to get license to audit listed firms, and second these regulations encourage audit firms to merge with each other to form 10 Chinese 
big audit firms to compete with international big 4 audit firms. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
All years No. ACs No. AFs No. EPs Avg. DA Median. DA 
1999 839 106 670 0.064 0.044 
2000 970 70 752 0.065 0.046 
2001 1,116 71 864 0.069 0.046 
2002 1,189 71 957 0.069 0.045 
2003 1,245 72 1,040 0.071 0.044 
2004 1,341 72 1,230 0.071 0.047 
2005 1,428 70 1,317 0.063 0.042 
2006 1,427 68 1,449 0.068 0.045 
2007 1,505 64 1,594 0.157 0.080 
2008 1,616 50 1,690 0.115 0.055 
2009 1,650 60 1,798 0.102 0.051 
2010 1,799 54 2,146 0.113 0.068 
2011 2,149 53 2,344 0.145 0.069 
2012 2,402 53 2,589 0.073 0.039 
No. ACs is number of audit clients; No.AFs is number of audit firms; No.EPs is number of engagement partners; Avg.DA is 
the average of absolute discretionary accruals; Median.DA is the median of absolute discretionary accruals. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
 One outstanding question raised by Francis (2011) is how to understand the role of engagement auditor 
in determining audit quality. Another outstanding question raised by Lawrence et al. (2012) is how to separate the 
effects of audit client characteristics on audit quality. In this section, we show the results of a simultaneous ANOVA 
approach for Equation (1) in comparison with the results for a variety of related models where restrictions have 
imposed on. We also show the incremental explanatory power associated with year, audit firm, audit client, and 
engagement auditor effects, respectively. 
 
The results of the analysis-of-variance on Equation (1) are shown in Figure 2. The model at the bottom of 
the figure incorporates the year effects, audit firm effects, audit client effects, and engagement auditor effects, which 
corresponds to the fully specified model in Equation (1). All other entries in Figure 2 correspond to model in which 
at least one class of effects is restricted to zero. Figure 2 also shows the ordinary and adjusted R
2
 for each model. 
Each line is accompanied by the probability at which an F-test rejects the corresponding restriction using Vuong’s 
(1989) Likelihood Ratio Tests (LRT) for model selection. 
 
Consider first the fully specified model at the bottom of Figure 2, which includes all the effects of year, 
audit firm, audit clients, and engagement auditor. Each of the lines immediately above this model points to a model 
in which one type of effect is omitted
16
. From the left, the first two of these lines are associated with restrictions on 
engagement auditor and audit client effects, respectively. In each case, the level of the F-test rejects the restriction 
with 1% confidence, which indicates that the engagement auditor effects and audit client effects significantly 
account for audit quality. The third line points to a model in which audit firm effects are restricted. The F-test does 
not reject the exclusion because audit firm effects are linear by design with engagement auditor effects. When 
comparing models, we invoke the inherent “nested” nature of an ANOVA. The description of our models as 
“simultaneous” ANOVA derives from the fact that each model present in the figure is estimated while accounting 
for covariance between the estimated effects. 
 
The next-highest layer of Figure 2 contains three models in which three of the four effects are reported. The 
first model of the second-highest layer includes year, audit firm, and engagement auditor effects. The model 
generates an R
2
 of 0.1969, which is significantly different from the R
2
 (0.3877) of the full-specific model at the 
bottom of Figure 2, indicating that audit client can add significant explanation power to audit quality. The second 
model of the second-highest layer includes year, audit firm, and audit client effects. The model generates an R
2
 of 
0.2483, which is significantly different from the R
2
 (0.3877) of the full-specific model at the bottom of Figure 2, 
indicating that audit partner can add significant explanation power to audit quality. The third model of the second-
highest layer includes year, audit client, and audit partner effects. The model generates an R
2
 of 0.3825, which is not 
                                                 
16 For simplicity, Figure 1 does not show the results for the models that exclude the year effects. Year effects are significant. 
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significantly different from the R
2
 (0.3877) of the full-specific model at the bottom of Figure 2, indicating that audit 
firm cannot add significant explanation power to audit quality because of linearity by design with audit client 
effects. These results provide evidence that audit client and audit partner effects significantly contribute to 
explanatory power to audit quality. 
 
 
Figure 2. Analysis Of Variance On Equation (1) 
Note: This figure reports the estimated rate of correlation, the R2, and the adjusted R2 in models that include various set of effects. Each line is 
accompanied by a figure that represents the probability with which the model rejects the restriction indicated by comparing the two models. For 
example, the model at the bottom of the figure includes year, audit firm, audit client, and audit partner effects, and generates an R2 of 0.3877. The 
model immediately above it excludes the audit client effects, and generates an R2 of 0.2483. The difference in the explanatory power of the two 
models is significant at the 99% level, and indicate by the “>0.99” that accompanies the restriction. Thus, the analysis shows that audit client 
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The third-highest group of lines corresponds to restrictions on models in which two of four effects are 
presented. Audit client and audit partner effects have important explanatory power in the fixed-effects model. Audit 
firm has incremental explanatory power in the model of year, audit firm, and audit client effects in compare with 
model of year and audit client effects. However, the incremental explanatory power of audit firm vanished in the 
model of year, audit firm, and audit partner because of the linearity by design. The adjusted R
2
 drops by a relatively 
small amount when audit firm is removed from the model with year, audit firm, and audit client effects. The 
remaining models also reject the exclusion of all effects. 
 
The final group of restrictions at the top of the figure provides information about the explanatory power of 
each type of effect on its own. In compare with the null model, the explanatory power of year effects, audit firm 
effects, audit client effects, and audit partner effects is 0.0114, 0.0210, 0.1694, and 0.2363, respectively. When only 
one of the classes of effects is present, the F-statistic never rejects the restriction to the null model. In sum, Figure 2 
confirms that all four types of effects: year, audit firm, audit client, and audit partner, are justified for inclusion in 
the full model. 
 
Table 2 displays the results from Figure 2 on the incremental explanatory power for each type of effect. To 
construct Table 2, we calculated the incremental explanatory power to the ordinary and adjusted R
2
 with effects 
introduced in the following order: year, audit firm, audit client, and audit partner
17
. Year effects add just over 1% to 
both ordinary and adjusted R
2
. Audit firm effects add less than 2% to both ordinary and adjusted R
2
. Audit client 
effects add 6%-17% and audit partner effects add 9%-20%. Therefore, audit client effects and audit partner effects 
are two of more important effects than the other two types of effects, and the audit partner effects is of the most 
important among all type of effects. Thus, the findings in this paper generally provide evidence that audit client and 
audit partner are two of the most important factors in determining audit quality. 
 
Table 2. Incremental Explanatory Power By Each Type Of Effect 
 Ordinary R2 Adjusted R2 
Yeara 1.14% 1.07% 
Audit Firmb 1.92% 1.28% 
Audit Clientc 16.63% 6.17% 
Audit Partnerd 19.08% 9.69% 
Fall Model 38.77% 18.21% 
Notes: 
a Incremental explanatory power in model of year effects over null model. 
b Incremental explanatory power in model of year and audit firm effects over model of year effects. 
c Incremental explanatory power in model of year, audit firm, and audit client effects over model of year and audit firm effects. 
d Incremental explanatory power in full model over model of year, audit firm, and audit client effects. 
 
In the untabulated results, the rate of serial correlation in residuals (ρ) also calculated for each of the model. 
For the full model at the bottom of Figure 2, the rate of serial correlation in residuals is 23.8%. In restricted models, 
the rate of serial correlation in residuals is higher because the residuals include the omitted effects. In the full model, 
the rate of serial correlation represents the tendencies of shocks in a specific year to affect audit quality in the 
subsequent year. Because the effects of audit firm and engagement auditor are defined to apply across the entire 14-
year period, the serial correlation in the residuals reflects any shock with intertemporal influence greater than one 
year but less than the full 14-year period under study. 
 
Table 3 presents the results from models corrected for serial correlation. The first column reports the results 
from the uncorrected model for reference. The second column displays results when each of the constituent models 
(i.e., the model of year effects, the model of year and audit firm effects, the model of year, audit firm, and audit 
client effects, and the model of year, audit firm, audit client, and engagement auditor effects) is corrected for its own 
estimated serial correlation. The results are substantially close to those in the uncorrected model. The approach used 
in this paper is the standard method for dealing with serial correlation, which generates R
2
 that are based on different 
sums of squares because observations are corrected for different rates of serial correlation in each model. The results 
                                                 
17 If engagement auditor effects were introduced before audit firm effects, then audit firm effects would have no explanatory power because audit 
quality differences in audit firm would be previously captured in the engagement auditor effects. We believe that this order of introduction would 
be minimally informative. 
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displayed in the third column of Table 3 report the incremental explanatory power (R
2
) by each type of effects after 




 in the models are directly comparable with each other because all the 
models have the total sum of squares. The results for models after dealing with serial correlation are similar to those 
before dealing with serial correlation, which indicate that the results find in this paper are robust. That is, beside the 
audit firm, audit client and engagement auditor are two of the most important factors in the determination of audit 
quality. 
 
Table 3. Incremental Explanatory Power By Each Type Of Effect In Models Dealing With Serial Correlation 
 Uncorrected Model Standard Correction Correction On Full Model 
Yeara 1.14% 1.03% 1.04% 
Audit firmb 1.92% 1.88% 1.90% 
Audit clientc 16.63% 16.21% 16.25 
Audit partnerd 19.08% 18.73% 18.20% 
Full model 38.77% 38.42% 37.93% 
Notes: 
a Incremental explanatory power in model of year effects over null model. 
b Incremental explanatory power in model of year and audit firm effects over model of year effects. 
c Incremental explanatory power in model of year, audit firm, and audit client effects over model of year and audit firm effects. 
d Incremental explanatory power in full model over model of year, audit firm, and audit client effects. 
 
5. SENSITIVIEY TESTS 
 
In the prior section, using absolute discretionary accruals as the proxy of low audit quality, this paper has 
documented that audit client and engagement auditor are two of most important factors to the variance of audit 
quality, which can add about 16% and 19% of incremental explanatory power. However, the absolute discretionary 
accruals only can reflect audit quality on a certain aspect, which is the auditor’s ability to constraint managements’ 
discretion in reporting earnings. For the robustness, it requires us to find other ways to measure audit quality. 
Palmorse and Scholz (2004) and Kinney et al. (2004) argue that a material restatement of audited financial 
statements is a strong signal that the audit was of low quality. Panel on Audit Effectiveness (PAE) (2000) states 
“Restatements also raise the question, ‘Where were the auditors?’ suggesting that there may be something wrong 
with the very concept of audits performed private-sector auditors who are largely self-regulated.” (PAE Par. 1.6). 
PAE also states “Restatements of previously audited financial statements raise questions about whether the system 
that provides assurances about both the quality of audits and the reliability of financial reports is operating 
effectively” (PAE Par.3.26). After investigating 3,744 financial restatements, Plumlee and Yohn (2010) identify four 
main reasons for financial restatements: internal company error, intentional manipulation, transaction complexity, 
and characteristics of accounting standards. Francis and Michas (2013) believe that the external auditor bears some 
responsibility for allowing a company to issue misstated financial statements due to any of these four reasons of 
restatements, and Francis and Michas (2013) use financial restatement as proxy of low audit quality. Therefore, 
following Palmorse and Scholz (2004), Kinney et al. (2004), and Francis and Michas (2013), we also use financial 
restatement as the proxy of low audit quality in this section, analyzing the variance of audit quality. 
 
Financial restatement (FR) is a dummy variable, which equals one when a client restates net income 
downward, otherwise it equals zero. Here, we use FR to substitute the dependent variable in Equation (1) and the 
independent variables are the same as in Equation (1). Table 4 reports the results of incremental explanatory power 
for each specific effects (Year, Audit firm, Audit client, and Engagement auditor). The year effects, audit firm 
effects, audit client effects, and engagement auditor effects can add about 2%, 4%, 6%, and 19% of incremental 
explanatory, respectively. Although the difference of incremental explanatory power between audit firm effects and 
audit client effects is much smaller than the results in Table 2, audit client effects is still the second most important 
factor in determining audit quality which accounts for about 6% of incremental explanatory power in the variance of 
audit quality. Similar to the results presented in Table 2, the engagement auditor effects is still the most important 
factor in determination of audit quality which accounts for about 19% of incremental explanatory power in the 
variance of audit quality. Table 5 presents the results after dealing with serial correlation, the results have no 
                                                 
18The results are based on the estimates generated by the standard serial correlation (from Column 2) and the total sums of squares on the 
uncorrected data 
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significant difference with the results before dealing with serial correlation. The results displayed in Tables 4 and 5 
provide additional evidence that audit clients and audit auditors are two of the most important factors in determining 
audit quality. 
 
Table 4. Incremental Explanatory Power By Each Type Of Effect  
(Dependent Variable: Financial Restatement) 
 Pseudo R2 
Yeara 2.24% 
Audit Firmb 4.32% 
Audit Clientc 6.20% 
Audit Partnerd 19.08% 
Fall Model 31.84% 
Notes: 
a Incremental explanatory power in model of year effects over null model. 
b Incremental explanatory power in model of year and audit firm effects over model of year effects. 
c Incremental explanatory power in model of year, audit firm, and audit client effects over model of year and audit firm effects. 
d Incremental explanatory power in full model over model of year, audit firm, and audit client effects. 
 
Table 5. Incremental Explanatory Power By Each Type Of Effect In Models Dealing With Serial Correlation  
(Dependent Variable: Financial Restatement) 
 Uncorrected Model Standard Correction Correction On Full Model 
Yeara 2.24% 2.20% 2.23% 
Audit firmb 4.32% 4.41% 4.45% 
Audit clientc 6.20% 6.21% 6.16 
Audit partnerd 19.08% 18.94% 18.59% 
Full model 31.84% 31.57% 31.24% 
Notes: 
a Incremental explanatory power in model of year effects over null model. 
b Incremental explanatory power in model of year and audit firm effects over model of year effects. 
c Incremental explanatory power in model of year, audit firm, and audit client effects over model of year and audit firm effects. 
d Incremental explanatory power in full model over model of year, audit firm, and audit client effects.  
 
 For the robustness, we also surrogate audit quality with: (1) absolute value of performance adjusted 
discretionary accruals proposed by Kothari et al (2005) and the abnormal working capital accruals proposed by 
Dechow and Dichev (2002)
19
. The untablated results are similar to the results in Table 2. The CSRC enforcement 
action is the direct measure of low audit quality, but there are only 89 engagement auditors punished by CSRC 
during our sample period. Therefore, we use financial restatements and/or engagement partners penalties as the 
proxy of low audit quality, and we get the similar results when only use financial restatements as the proxy of low 
audit quality.  
 
6. ADDITIONAL TESTS 
 
 The analyses displayed in sections 4 and 5 resolve an important question about the variance in audit 
quality using simultaneous ANOVA method. The results indicate that engagement auditor is the most important 
factor in determining audit quality, which can add about 19% of incremental explanatory power. To some extent, 
this finding provides some quantitative evidence to several recent studies, in which they focus on engagement 
auditors’ role in determining audit quality (Chi and Huang, 2005; Carey and Simnett 2006; Chi et al. 2009; Chen et 
al. 2010; Wang et al. 2012). Using engagement auditor data from Taiwan, Chi and Huang (2005) find evidence 
consistent with lower audit quality in the early years of auditor tenure and later years of tenure, Chi et al. (2009) find 
that investors perceive mandatory audit-partner rotation as enhancing audit quality. Based on engagement auditor 
data from Australia, Carey and Simnett (2006) find that longer engagement auditor tenure associated with lower 
propensity to issue going-concern audit opinion. Using engagement auditor data from China mainland, Wang et al. 
(2012) find that engagement auditors’ total audit experience is positively associated with audit quality. 
 
                                                 
19 The abnormal working capital accruals captures the degree to which working capital accruals fail to map into past, current, and future cash 
flows developed by Dechow and Dichev (2002). 
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 Given the important of engagement auditors’ audit experience in determining audit quality, engagement 
auditor with different kind of audit experience may have different incremental explanatory power. To shed further 
light on the determinants of variance in audit quality, following Wang et al. (2012), we decompose audit experience 
into auditors’ general audit experience and client-specific audit experience. The general audit experience refers to 
the total number of years since from an auditor first sign his/her name on the audit report. We expect that 
engagement auditor with longer audit experience have higher audit quality, and therefore may have more 
incremental explanatory power to the variance in audit quality. The client-specific audit experience refers to the total 
number of years that an auditor signs his/her name on a special client’s financial report. Chi and Huang (2005) and 
Carey and Simnett (2006) suggest deterioration in audit quality in the early years of tenure due to the loss of client-
specific knowledge and expertise, and they also suggest that the long tenure may impair engagement auditor’s 
independence which may cause low audit quality. Chi and Huang (2005) and Carey and Simnett (2006) conclude 
that auditors in medium-term audit tenure have higher audit quality. According to Chi and Huang (2005) and Carey 
and Simnett (2006) and the relative policies in China, we expect that the audit quality should be at its maximum 




 In this section, we use two sub-samples to investigate whether engagement auditor tenure can mediate 
the relationship between audit quality and engagement auditor. One sub-sample includes engagement partners with 
general audit experience greater than the median, and the other sub-sample includes engagement auditors with 
medium client-specific audit experience (the audit tenure is between 3 to five years). Using the simultaneous 
ANOVA method, Table 6 displays the incremental explanatory power of each effects according to Equation (1) 
based on sub-samples. Panel A and B report the incremental explanatory power of each effects using general audit 
experience sub-sample and client-specific experience sub-sample, respectively. Surprisingly, the longer general 
audit experience and the medium client-specific audit experience add no more incremental explanatory power to the 
variance in audit quality. The findings here consistent with the conclusions in the current literature, most of the 
studies find mixed results or no results about the impact of engagement auditor tenure on audit quality. Table 7 
reports the results after dealing with serial correlation using general audit experience sub-sample and client-specific 
experience sub-sample. The results in Panel A and B of Table 7 have no significant difference from the results in 
Panel A and B of Table 6. 
 
Table 6. Incremental Explanatory Power By Each Type Of Effects Based On Sub-Samples 
 Ordinary R2 Adjusted R2 
Panel A Incremental explanatory power by each type of effects based on general experience sub-sample 
Yeara 1.09% 1.04% 
Audit Firmb 1.87% 1.21% 
Audit Clientc 16.19% 6.06% 
Audit Partnerd 18.75% 9.58% 
Fall Model 37.46% 18.04% 
Panel B Incremental explanatory power by each type of effects based on client-specific experience sub-sample 
Yeara 1.10% 1.03% 
Audit Firmb 1.92% 1.25% 
Audit Clientc 16.37% 6.11% 
Audit Partnerd 18.83% 9.64% 
Fall Model 37.69% 18.10% 
Notes: 
a Incremental explanatory power in model of year effects over null model. 
b Incremental explanatory power in model of year and audit firm effects over model of year effects. 
c Incremental explanatory power in model of year, audit firm, and audit client effects over model of year and audit firm effects. 





                                                 
20 In U.S., the regulation requires that the lead engagement auditor and audit review partner be rotated every five years on public company 
engagements after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Australia and Taiwan, the regulations also require that the engagement auditors should be 
mandatory rotation every five years. In China, the relative regulations require that the state-owned enterprise should rotate its engagement auditor 
every five years. 
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Table 7. Incremental Explanatory Power By Each Type  
Of Effects Based On Sub-Samples In Models After Dealing With Serial Correlation 
 Uncorrected Model Standard Correction Correction On Full Model 
Panel A Incremental explanatory power by each type of effects based on general experience sub-sample in models after 
dealing with serial correlation 
Yeara 1.09% 0.96% 1.01% 
Audit Firmb 1.87% 1.85% 1.87% 
Audit Clientc 16.19% 15.78% 16.09% 
Audit Partnerd 18.75% 18.22% 18.76% 
Fall Model 37.46% 37.01% 37.33% 
Panel B Incremental explanatory power by each type of effects based on client-specific experience sub-sample in models 
after dealing with serial correlation 
Yeara 1.10% 0.94% 0.99% 
Audit Firmb 1.92% 1.88% 1.90% 
Audit Clientc 16.37% 16.02% 16.11% 
Audit Partnerd 18.83% 18.27% 18.54% 
Fall Model 37.69% 37.36% 37.55% 
Notes: 
a Incremental explanatory power in model of year effects over null model. 
b Incremental explanatory power in model of year and audit firm effects over model of year effects. 
c Incremental explanatory power in model of year, audit firm, and audit client effects over model of year and audit firm effects. 
d Incremental explanatory power in full model over model of year, audit firm, and audit client effects. 
 
 We also use financial restatements and CSRC enforcement actions to surrogate low audit quality, the 




 Motivated by the intensifying worldwide interest in, but insufficient empirical evidence of, whether the 
audit client and engagement audit auditor matter to variance of audit quality, we investigate this issue by exploring 
the Chinese audit and stock market where engagement audit auditors are mandated to sign audit reports. 
 
 Using discretionary accruals and financial restatement as proxies of audit quality and based on 
simultaneous ANOVA method, we find that engagement auditor is the most important factor in determining audit 
quality, which can add about 19% of incremental explanatory power to the variance in audit quality. In addition to 
engagement auditor, we find that audit client effects can add about 16% of incremental explanatory power to the 
variance in audit quality, which support the recent argument by many scholars that it is audit client characteristics 
that cause the significant difference in audit quality instead of the audit firm itself (Chen et al. 2010; Lawrence et al. 
2011). Not surprisingly, the audit firm effects only add about 2% of incremental explanatory power to the variance 
in audit quality, which provide further support to the argument. The results are robust when we use other methods to 
measure audit quality. In the additional tests, we find that engagement auditors with more general and/or firm-
specific audit experience cannot significantly increase engagement auditor’s importance in determining audit 
quality. 
 
This paper contributes to literature from two aspects. First, this paper explores the role of audit client in 
determining audit quality. Literature on audit quality only investigates the variance of audit quality from the 
perspective of audit firm characteristics. Recently, Lawrence et al. (2011) argue that the variety of audit quality 
between Big 4 and non-Big 4 audit firms is due to audit client characteristics, and they encourage researchers to 
explore alternative methodologies to separate audit client characteristics from audit-quality. The findings of this 
paper that audit firm and audit client add about 2% and 16% of incremental explanatory power to the variance of 
audit quality, respectively, providing some empirical evidence to the argument of Lawrence et al. (2011). Second, 
this paper investigates the role of engagement audit auditor in determining audit quality. Public Oversight Board 
state “The most important determinants of audit effectiveness are the personal attributes and skills of the individual 
auditor” (2000). Francis (2011) encourages that future research on audit quality should pay attention to engagement 
auditors’ role in determining audit quality. However, except for experimental researches provide some evidence that 
audit quality varies with individual auditor characteristics (Nelson and Tan 2005; Nelson 2009), there is no 
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empirical study investigating engagement auditors’ role based on large sample. This study fills in this gap, and finds 
that engagement auditor is the most important factor in determining audit quality.  
 
The evidence of this paper has policy implications to regulators. The findings of this paper that individual 
engagement auditors have significant influence over audit quality provide support to the mandatory auditor 
signature. This study also has research implications. The findings of this paper indicate that it is important to study 
audit quality from perspectives of audit client and individual engagement auditor. Future researches should study the 




This paper is financial supported by China Postdoctoral Science Foundation (2014M550505) and National Natural 




Baolei Qi is an assistant professor in School of Management, Xi’an Jiaotong University, P.R. China. 
 
Bin Li is a post doctor in School of Management, Xi’an Jiaotong University, P.R. China. E-mail: 
libin@mail.xjtu.edu.cn (corresponding author) 
 




1. Abbott, L., S. Parker, & G. Peters. (2004). Audit committee characteristics and restatements. Auditing: A 
Journal of Practice & Theory 23 (1): 69-87. 
2. Antle, R., & B. Nalebuff. (1991). Conservatism and auditor-client negotiations. Journal of Accounting 
Research 29 (supplement): 31-54. 
3. Balsam, S., J. Krishnan, & J. Yang. (2003). Auditor industry specialization and earnings quality. Auditing: 
A Journal of Practice & Theory 22 (2): 71-97. 
4. Bazerman, M., K. Morgan, & G. Loewenstein. (1997). The impossibility of auditor independence. Sloan 
Management Review 38 (4): 89-94. 
5. Becker, C., M. DeFond, J. Jiambalvo, & K. R. Subramanyam. (1998). The effect of audit quality on 
earnings management. Contemporary Accounting Research (1): 1-24. 
6. Behn, B., J. Choi, & T. Kang. (2008). Audit quality and properties of analysts’ earnings forecasts. The 
Accounting Review (2): 327-349. 
7. Carey, P., & R. Simnett. (2006). Audit partner tenure and audit quality. The Accounting Review 81 (3):653-
676. 
8. Carcello, J., & T. Neal. (2000). Audit committee composition and auditor reporting. The Accounting 
Review 75 (4): 453-467. 
9. Chen, C., C. Lin, & Y. Lin. (2008). Audit partner tenure, audit firm tenure, and discretionary accruals: 
Does long auditor tenure impair earnings quality? Contemporary Accounting Research 25 (2): 415-444. 
10. Chen, S., Y. J .Sun, & D. Wu. (2010). Client importance, institutional improvements, and audit quality in 
China: An office and individual auditor level analysis. The Accounting Review, 85 (1): 127-158. 
11. Chi, W, & H. Huang. (2005). Discretionary accruals, audit-firm tenure and audit partner tenure: Empirical 
evidence from Taiwan. Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics 1 (1): 65-92. 
12. Chi, W., H. Huang, Y. Liao, & H. Xie. (2009). Mandatory audit partner rotation, audit quality, and market 
perception: Evidence from Taiwan. Contemporary Accounting Research 26 (2): 359-391. 
13. Chin, C., & H. Chi. (2010). Gender differences in audit quality. Working Paper, National Chengchi 
University and National Chung Hsing University. 
14. Choi, J., C. Kim, & Y. Zang. (2010). Audit office size, audit quality, and audit pricing. Auditing: A Journal 
of Practice & Theory 29 (1): 73-97. 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – January/February 2015 Volume 31, Number 1 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 86 The Clute Institute 
15. Craswell, A., D. Stokes, & J. Laughton. (2002). Auditor independence and fee dependence. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 32 (2): 253-275. 
16. DeAngelo, L. (1981). Auditor size and audit quality. Journal of Accounting and Economics 3 (3): 183-199. 
17. Dechow, P. M, & L. D. Dichev. (2002). The quality of accruals and earnings: The role of accruals 
estimation errors. The Accounting Review 77 (Supplement): 35-59. 
18. Dechow, P. M., R. G. Solan, & A. P. Sweeney. (1995). Detecting earnings management. The Accounting 
Review 70 (2): 193-225. 
19. DeFond, M. L. (2002). Discussion of the balance sheet as an earnings management constraint. The 
Accounting Review 77 (Supplement): 29-33. 
20. DeFond, M.L., & J. R. Francis. (2005). Audit research after Sarbanes-Oxley. Auditing: A Journal of 
Practice & Theory 24 (Supplement): 5-30. 
21. Ferguson, A., J. Francis, & D. Stokes. (2003). The effects of firm-wide and office-level industry expertise 
on audit pricing. The Accounting Review 78 (2): 429-448. 
22. Francis, J. (2011). A framework for understanding and researching audit quality. Auditing: A Journal of 
Practice & Theory 30 (2): 125-152. 
23. Francis, J., E.L. Maydew, & H.C. Sparks. (1999). The role of Big 6 auditors in the credible reporting of 
accruals. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 18 (2): 17-34. 
24. Francis, J., K. Reichelt, & D. Wang. (2005). The pricing of national and city-specific reputations for 
industry expertise in the U.S. audit market. The Accounting Review 80 (1):113-136. 
25. Francis, J., & J. Krishnan. (1999). Accounting accruals and auditor reporting conservatism. Contemporary 
Accounting Research 16 (1): 135-165. 
26. Francis, J., & M. Yu. (2009). The effect of Big 4 office size on audit quality. The Accounting Review 84 
(5): 1521-1552. 
27. Francis, J., & P. N. Michas. (2013). The contagion effect of low-quality audits. The Accounting Review 88 
(2): 521-552. 
28. Ghosh, A, & D. Moon. (2005). Auditor tenure and perceptions of audit quality. The Accounting Review 80 
(2): 585-612. 
29. Gibbins, M., S. McCracken, & S. Salterio. (2010). The auditor’s strategy selection for negotiation with 
management: Flexibility of initial accounting position and nature of the relationship. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society 35 (6): 579-595. 
30. Hackenbrack, K., & W. R. Knechel. (1997). Resource allocation decisions in audit engagements. 
Contemporary Accounting Research 14 (3):481-499. 
31. Hurrt, R. Kathy. (2010). Development of scale to measure professional skepticism. Auditing: A Journal of 
Practice & Theory 29 (1): 149-171. 
32. Kahn, M., & R. Watts. (2009). Estimation and empirical properties of a firm-year measure of accounting 
conservatism. Journal of Accounting and Economics 48 (2-3): 132-150. 
33. Khurana, I., & K. K. Raman. (2004). Are Big 4 audits in ASEAN countries of higher quality than non-Big 
4 audits? Asia Pacific Journal of Accounting and Economics 11 (2): 139-165. 
34. Kinney, W. R., Z. V. Palmrose, & S. Scholz. (2004). Auditor independence, non-audit services, and 
restatements: Was the U. S. government right? Journal of Accounting Research 42 (3): 561-588. 
35. Knechel, W. R., P. Rouse, & C. Schelleman. (2009). A modified audit production framework: Evaluating 
the relative efficiency of audit engagements. The Accounting Review 84 (5): 1607-1638. 
36. Kothari, S. P., A. J. Leone, & C. E. Wasley. (2005). Performance matched discretionary accrual measures. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 39 (1):163-197. 
37. Krishnan, G.V. (2003). Does Big 6 auditor industry expertise constrain earnings management? Accounting 
Horizons (supplement): 1-16. 
38. Lawrence, A., M. Minutti-Meza, & P. Zhang. (2011). Can Big 4 versus non-Big 4 differences in audit-
quality proxies be attributed to client characteristics? The Accounting Review 86 (1): 259-286. 
39. Lennox, C. (1999). Are large auditors more accurate than small auditors? Accounting and Business 
Research 29 (3): 217-227. 
40. Li, C. (2009). Does client importance affect auditor independence at the office level? Empirical evidence 
from going-concern opinions. Contemporary Accounting Research 26 (1): 201-230. 
41. Lu, T., & H. Sapra. (2009). Auditor conservatism and investment efficiency. The Accounting Review 84 
(6): 1933-1958. 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – January/February 2015 Volume 31, Number 1 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 87 The Clute Institute 
42. McGahan, A. M., & M. E. Porter. (2002). What do we know about variance in accounting profitability? 
Management Science 48 (7): 834-851. 
43. Nelson, M., & H. Tan. (2005). Judgment and decision making research auditing: A task, person, and 
interpersonal interaction perspective. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 24 (Supplement): 41-71. 
44. Nelson, M., J. Elliott, & R. Tarpley. (2002). Evidence from auditors about managers’ and auditors’ 
earnings management decisions. The Accounting Review 77 (Supplement): 175-202. 
45. Palmrose, Z-V. (1988). An analysis of auditor litigation and audit service quality. The Accounting Review 
63(1): 55-73. 
46. Palmrose, Z-V., & S. Scholz. (2004). The circumstances and legal consequences of non-GAAP reporting: 
Evidence from restatements. Contemporary Accounting Research 21 (1): 139-180. 
47. Pittman, J., & S. Fortin. (2004). The impact of auditor’s reputation on the cost of financing. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 37 (1): 113-136. 
48. Plumlee, M., & T. L. Yohn. (2010). An analysis of the underlying cause attributed to restatements. 
Accounting Horizon 24 (1): 41-64. 
49. Prawitt, D., J. L. Simth, & D. A. Wood. (2009). Internal audit quality and earnings management. The 
Accounting Review 84 (4): 1255-1280. 
50. Reichelt, J.K., & D.Wang. (2010). National and office-specific measures of auditor industry expertise and 
effects on audit quality. Journal of Accounting and Economics 30 (3): 375-400. 
51. Reynolds, J.D., & J. Francis. (2000). Does size matter? The influence of large clients on office-level auditor 
reporting decisions. Journal of Accounting and Economics 33 (3): 375-400. 
52. Teoh, S., & T. J. Wong. (1993). Perceived auditor quality and the earnings response coefficient. The 
Accounting Review 68 (2): 346-366. 
53. Wang, Y., L. Yu, Z. Zhang, & Y. Zhao. (2012). Engaging audit partner experience and audit quality. AAA 
conference, Washington D.C. 
54. Wallman, S. M. H. (1996). The future of accounting, part three: Reliability and auditor independence. 
Accounting Horizons 10 (December): 76-97. 
55. Vuong, Q. H. (1989). Likelihood ratio tests for model selection and non-nested hypotheses. Econometrical: 
Journal of the Econometric Society 57 (2): 307-333. 
 
  
The Journal of Applied Business Research – January/February 2015 Volume 31, Number 1 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 88 The Clute Institute 
NOTES 
